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“Teachers, principals, legislators, and judges have been wrangling for
decades in their attempts to find the right doctrinal formula for school
speech.”2
I.

THE NEW AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

Social media is an integral part of modern society. People of all
generations use social media as an online platform to share information
and interact with known and unknown contacts.3 There is an online
resource for virtually every interest imaginable. People can share videos
1. Lily Strumwasser is an attorney in the Chicago office of Seyfarth Shaw LLP in the
area of labor and employment law. Ms. Strumwasser publishes regularly on a variety of
employment and litigation topics, including social media compliance issues, focusing on
best practices to avoid litigation and develop internal compliance initiatives. Prior to
joining Seyfarth, Ms. Strumwasser held a judicial externship with the Honorable Charles
Kocoras of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and the Honorable
James G. Carr of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Contact:
lstrumwasser@seyfarth.com.
From the author: A special thanks to Ira, Jennifer, and Conor for your encouragement
and unwavering support. I would also like to thank Theodore Sky, Professor of
Education Law and retired senior counsel to the general counsel of the U.S. Department
of Education, and Mary Kay Klimesh, Partner at Seyfarth Shaw LLP for their invaluable
insight and assistance on the development of this Article.
2. ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: THE UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE SPEECH IN
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2 (2009).
3. See Sana Rouis, Moez Limayem & Esmail Salehi-Sangari, Impact of Facebook
Usage on Students’ Academic Achievement: Roles of Self-Regulation and Trust, 9(3) ELEC. J.
OF RES. IN EDUC. PSYCHOL. 961, 965 (2011), http://investigacion-psicopedagogica.org/
revista/new/english/ContadorArticulo.php?620.
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on YouTube,4 post pictures on Pinterest,5 and offer status updates on
Twitter.6 Professionals can network by displaying their resumes on
LinkedIn7 or through advertising their businesses on blogs.8 Reddit is a
social news site that permits users to comment on posted items.9 The
online dating industry is also a hot commodity. In 2012, over forty
million people used websites such as eHarmony and Match.com.10 And
then there is Facebook—the world’s largest social network.11 Facebook
alone has 1.4 billion members.12
4. See YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). In 2011,
“YouTube ha[d] 490 million unique users who visit[ed] every month,” and “generate[d]
92 billion page views per month.” Jeff Bullas, 20 Stunning Social Media Statistics Plus
Infographic, JEFFBULLAS.COM (Sept. 2, 2011, 8:58 AM), http://www.jeffbullas.com/2011/
09/02/20-stunning-social-media-statistics/. Furthermore, “[u]sers on YouTube spen[t] a
total of 2.9 billion hours per month” on the site. Id.
5. See PINTEREST, https://pinterest.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). In May 2012,
Pinterest was “the third most popular social network, behind Twitter and Facebook (in
the U.S.).” Cara Pring, 99 New Social Media Stats for 2012, THE SOCIAL SKINNY, (May 10,
2012), http://thesocialskinny.com/99-new-social-media-stats-for-2012/.
6. See TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). On average, in
2011, Twitter handled 1.6 billion queries per day. Bullas, supra note 4. Additionally, in
May 2011, there were approximately 190 Tweets posted per day, and roughly 500,000
users were added to the site. Id. Furthermore, in 2012, “65% of the world’s top
companies ha[d] an active Twitter profile.” Pring, supra note 5.
7. See LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
8. In 2012, “91% of experienced social marketers [saw] improved website traffic
due to social media campaigns and 79% [were] generating more quality leads.” Pring,
supra note 5. Meanwhile, “23% of Fortune 500 companies ha[d] a public-facing
corporate blog[,]” and “53% of small businesses [were] using social media.” Id.
9. See REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
10. See Online Dating Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN (June 18, 2013), http://www.
statisticbrain.com/online-dating-statistics/.
11. See Ken Burbary, Facebook Demographics Revisted – 2011 Statistics, SOCIALMEDIA
TODAY (March 7, 2011), http://socialmediatoday.com/kenburbary/276356/facebookdemographics-revisited-2011-statistics.
12. See Social Networking Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.
statisticbrain.com/social-networking-statistics/. An average Facebook user spends 15
hours and 33 minutes on Facebook per month. Id. Mark Zuckerberg launched
Facebook in 2004 when he was a student at Harvard University. See Sid Yadav, Facebook
- The Complete Biography, MASHABLE (Aug. 25, 2006), http://mashable.com/2006/08/25/
facebook-profile/.
Zuckerberg’s audience was originally college students, and
membership was restricted to students of Harvard University. One year later, Facebook
expanded to twenty-one universities. Shortly thereafter, Facebook further expanded to
permit high school students to access the social networking site. Now, virtually
anyone—including companies—can create a Facebook profile. Hits and Misses in
Facebook’s History, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 19, 2013 9:24 AM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/hits-and-misses-facebooks-history-0.
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A recent study examined the use of social networking websites and
revealed that seventy-nine percent of American adults use the Internet,
and fifty-nine percent of adult Internet users report that they use at least
one type of social networking website.13 Although adults have a clear
presence in social media, teenagers and young adults largely dominate
the industry.14 A striking ninety-eight percent of individuals eighteen to
twenty-four years old are connected to social media.15
Near constant connection to smart phones, iPads, and laptop
computers has made social media accessible almost anytime and
anywhere. The emergence of social media has created undeniable
disruptions at schools—especially inside the classroom. Cyber speech
raises legal issues relating to the forum of speech and the audience by
which it is heard. Now more than ever, courts are faced with the
question of whether school administrators can discipline students for
their off-campus cyber speech.16 There are no clear guidelines that
dictate the extent to which school administrators may discipline
students for such speech.17 In fact, only a handful of circuit courts have
weighed in on this issue.18 Nevertheless, such decisions have “produced

13. See Keith N. Hampton et al., Social Networking Sites and Our Lives, PEW INTERNET
& AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, 3 (June 16, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/
Reports/2011/PIP%20-%20Social%20networking%20sites%20and%20our%20lives.pdf.
14. Social Networking Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN (Aug. 12, 2013) http://
www.statisticbrain.com/social-networking-statistics/.
15. Id.; see also Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens and Social Media, PEW INTERNET &
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, 25 (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/
Reports/2007/PIP_Teens_Social_Media_Final.pdf.pdf (reporting that ninety-three
percent of teens use the Internet).
16. See Heidi A. Katz & Colette L. McCarty, Student Rights and Responsibilities, ILL.
INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. § 7.5, at 7-14 (2010), available at https://www.iicle.
com/links/SchoolLawPSI10-Ch7-McCarty.pdf. (“The extent to which school officials
may discipline or restrict off-campus ‘speech’ by students on the Internet consistent with
the First Amendment has been a growing concern for the last decade.”).
17. See id.
18. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding
that the school was authorized to discipline a student for off-campus speech that
“interfered with the work and discipline of the school”); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the school violated
a student’s free speech rights when it disciplined the student for creating a fake MySpace
profile of his principal); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 302 (3d
Cir. 2010) (holding that the school did not violate a student’s free speech rights by
disciplining the student for creating a vulgar, fake social media profile of the principal
which depicted the principal as a pedophile); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 53 (2d
Cir. 2008) (holding that the school did not violate the First Amendment by not allowing
a student to re-run for a class office after the student called school administrators
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a welter of precedents reflecting divergent reasoning and less-thanpredictable outcomes.”19
Because legal issues involving technology and education are
complex and unprecedented, it is only a matter of time until the United
States Supreme Court addresses the question of when schools can
discipline students for off-campus cyber speech. Until that time,
however, school administrators are in a “flex” position left wondering
whether disciplining a student for content on a social media website will
violate the First Amendment. This Article charts new territory and
addresses the extent to which school administrators can regulate
students’ off-campus cyber speech.
A. First Amendment Rights Collide with the Schoolhouse Gates—What
Have Courts Decided and Where Do We Go from Here?
This Article begins with a brief overview of the Supreme Court
rulings that provide the applicable body of law for determining when
school administrators can restrict student speech. Part II of this Article
addresses Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,”20
which provides the “most quoted adage in school law literature . . .
[that] students do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”21 The Supreme Court’s
decision in Tinker defined the contours of student free speech within
public schools. Part II also discusses the most transformative student
speech cases following Tinker, including: Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser22 and Morse v. Frederick.23
Part III examines the growing uncertainty among federal courts
regarding the extent to which school authorities may discipline students
for off-campus cyber speech. Parts IV and V attempt to clarify the
various rulings and advocate recognition of a clear standard for school
administrators to apply to off-campus cyber speech. Ultimately, this
Article provides suggestions to school administrators in dealing with off-

“douchebags” on a social media website); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent.
Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the school did not violate the
First Amendment for suspending a student after the student had circulated AOL instant
messaging icons depicting the shooting of the student’s English teacher).
19. Katz & McCarty, supra note 16, § 7.5 at 7-14.
20. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
21. Katz & McCarty, supra note 16, § 7.2 at 7-7 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
22. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
23. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
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campus cyber speech that may—or may not—be actionable inside the
schoolhouse gates.
B. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
Freedom of speech is a fundamental right that our founding fathers
explicitly included in the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.24 The legal protections of the First Amendment are a
critical component of democracy. Free speech supports the marketplace
of ideas—the freedom to express conflicting ideas so that the truth will
emerge.25 Free speech allows people to criticize the government and
each other, as well as to formulate their own ideas. Free speech
encourages stability, neutrality, and restraint from tyranny, corruption,
and ineptitude. It is designed in the hope that use of such freedom will
“ultimately produce a more capable citizenry.”26 Although the First
Amendment protects the fundamental right to free speech, this right is
not absolute in nature.27 Free speech rights are subject to restrictions,
and in limited circumstances, the prevention and punishment of speech
is constitutional.28
The first Supreme Court case to apply the concept of free speech to
the public school setting was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, which emerged in the midst of the Vietnam
War.29 The case began when John F. Tinker, his friend Chris, and his
sister Mary Beth created a plan to wear black armbands to school as a

24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
26. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). The Cohen Court explained the
hope as follows:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as
diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in
the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable
citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which
our political system rests.
Id.
27. See generally, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931).
28. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (noting that the public’s interest in national security may at times entitle the
government to curtail freedom of speech rights).
29. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
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symbol of their opposition to the War.30 The students’ intention was “to
make their views [about the Vietnam War] known, and, by their
example, to influence others to adopt them.”31 The school principal
became aware of the students’ plan and implemented a policy that
forbade students from wearing an armband to school.32 Nevertheless,
the students proceeded with their plan and wore black armbands to
school.33 Their political expression was “silent, passive . . . [and]
unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of the
[students].”34 The school suspended the students and told them that
they could not return to school until they removed their armbands.35
The students refused to remove their armbands and accepted the
suspensions.36 Subsequently, the students’ fathers filed a complaint on
their children’s behalf in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa.37 The parents challenged the constitutionality of the school
authorities’ action and argued that the suspensions violated the students’
First Amendment freedom of speech rights.38 The district court
dismissed the parents’ complaint, and the parents appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.39 The Eighth Circuit heard the
case en banc and affirmed the district court’s decision.40
The parents petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, and a writ
of certiorari was granted.41 The Supreme Court balanced the students’
First Amendment rights against the Court’s “repeated[] emphasi[s] [on]
the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of
school officials . . . to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”42
The Court explained that disciplining a student for her expressive
conduct is only permissible if the student’s conduct is disruptive and

30. Id. at 504.
31. Id. at 514.
32. Id. at 504.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 508.
35. Id. at 504.
36. Id.
37. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sc. Dist., 258 F.Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966)
rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
38. Id. at 972.
39. Id. at 973.
40. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967)
rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
41. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
42. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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“intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students.”43
Based on this standard, the Court held that the students’ conduct of
wearing the armbands was “closely akin to ‘pure speech’ . . . [and was]
entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.”44
The Court reasoned that only a few of the students wore armbands, and
there was no evidence that “the work of the schools or any class was
disrupted.”45 Because the school provided no evidence that the students’
speech interfered with school order, the Court concluded that the school
administrators’ actions impinged on the students’ right to express their
opinions in violation of the First Amendment.46
Tinker teaches school authorities that “students . . . [do not] shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”47 However, Tinker also makes clear that school
authorities may discipline students when their speech “materially and
substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline
in the operation of the school.”48 To reach the level of “material” and
“substantial” disruption, school officials’ concerns about students’ use of
speech or expression must be based on “something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”49
The determination of whether a student’s actions are disruptive is a
“fact-intensive” analysis.50
Thus, courts have reached varying
conclusions as to what constitutes a substantial disruption at school.
For example, in B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 School District, the Eighth
Circuit held that school administrators did not violate the First
Amendment when they restricted a student from wearing a shirt with a
Confederate flag on it because such clothing would reasonably result in
classroom disruption.51 However, in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court permitted a school administrator to
censor an article on teen pregnancy from a school newspaper because it
43. Id. at 508.
44. Id. at 505–06.
45. Id. at 508.
46. Id. at 514.
47. Id. at 506.
48. Id. at 509 (emphasis added) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749
(1966)).
49. Id.; see also Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student
Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 628 (2002) (discussing Tinker and how it currently
applies to schools’ ability to regulate student speech).
50. Miller, supra note 49, at 635.
51. B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 741 (8th Cir. 2009).
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determined that the administrator’s actions were reasonable in the
interest of time constraints and in the protection of the privacy rights of
those mentioned in the article.52 Over the last several decades,
numerous other courts have addressed student conduct to determine
whether it reaches the level of substantial disruption.53
C. Departing from the Disruptive Effect Analysis––Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser
For almost twenty years, Tinker was the “primary authority
governing the scope of free expression in the schools.”54 However, in
1986 in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Supreme Court
distinguished its protective position with regard to speech as witnessed
in Tinker.55
In Fraser, a student gave a speech at a school assembly nominating
another student for a student office position.56 His speech was sexually
explicit, and in the speech, he encouraged his fellow classmates to vote
for his friend in the upcoming election.57 The assistant principal of the
school then notified the student that his speech violated the school’s
“disruptive-conduct rule,” which prohibited conduct that “substantially
interfere[d] with the educational process.”58 As a result, the assistant
principal suspended the student for three days and announced that the
student would not be considered as a possible candidate for graduation
speaker at the school’s commencement ceremonies.59
The student’s father filed a suit on his son’s behalf, alleging that the
school’s disciplinary actions violated his son’s First Amendment right to
52. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262–63, 274–76 (1988).
53. See, e.g., Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir.
2008) (holding that symptoms of “substantial disruption” are proven “if there is reason to
think that a particular type of student speech will lead to a decline in students’ test
scores, [or] an upsurge in truancy”); Jenkins v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992,
1003 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that students’ speech amounted to “substantial
interference” when the students were going around the campus loudly beckoning fellow
students to organize and rally); Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 1970)
(holding that wearing anti-war demonstration buttons and distributing pamphlets
amounted to substantial disruption).
54. RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS AND
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 2:3, at 350 (2004).
55. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986).
56. Id. at 677.
57. Id. at 677–78.
58. Id. at 678.
59. Id.
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freedom of speech and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.60 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington agreed with the father, awarded the student monetary relief,
and “enjoined the School District from preventing [the student] from
speaking at the commencement ceremonies.”61 The School District
appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
subsequently affirmed.62
Following its grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court first noted the
“[t]he marked distinction between the political ‘message’ of the
armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of [Fraser’s] speech in this
case.”63 The Supreme Court then stressed “that the constitutional rights
of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the
rights of adults in other settings.”64 The Fraser Court held that “[t]he
First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining
that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech . . . would undermine the
school’s basic educational mission.”65 Thus, the Court reversed and
remanded the lower court’s decision, and upheld the disciplinary action
taken against the student.66 The Court reasoned that the student’s
speech was inappropriate for the audience of young students and that it
was “wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school
education.”67 Two important points can be discerned from the Court’s
holding in Fraser. First, had Fraser delivered the speech off-campus, he

60. Id. at 679.
61. Id. at 675–76.
62. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985) rev’d, 478 U.S.
675 (1986).
63. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.
64. Id. at 682. See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969) (noting that students’ speech rights are not the same as the rights of adults
and, therefore, the rights of students must be applied “in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment”).
65. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
66. Id. at 686–87.
67. Id. at 685–86. Another Supreme Court case supports this idea that the school
stands in a special relationship to students when it comes to the harmful influences of
society, such as illegal drugs. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of
Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002) (allowing suspicionless drug tests
to be conducted in public schools). It follows that schools have greater flexibility to
proscribe speech when they deem it contrary to educational interests—the old in loco
parentis principle. This rationale also lies behind the decision in Morse v. Frederick. See
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–10 (2007) (upholding a school’s decision to
discipline a student for displaying a banner advocating drug use at a school-sanctioned
event).
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would have been protected, but, because he acted on the school’s
campus, his speech was not protected. Second, Fraser established that
the Tinker substantial disruption analysis is not absolute.68
The Supreme Court’s decision in Fraser is a triumph for school
administrators.69 Fraser emphasizes “the importance of permitting the
expression of a variety of viewpoints in the schools,” yet simultaneously
broadens the deference owed to school administrators in making
disciplinary decisions.70 Writing for the majority of the Court, Chief
Justice Burger “deferred to the school authorities’ conclusory
determination that Fraser’s speech seriously disrupted the school’s
educational activities.”71
D. Testing the Limits of Tinker and Fraser––Student Off-Campus Speech
From Tinker and Fraser emerged two standards that are the bedrock
of school law decisions.72 Although courts “pay[] homage to the legacy
of Tinker [and Fraser],”73 it “is not completely clear whether [Tinker and]
Fraser appl[y] to off-campus student speech.”74 “Some courts have
drawn a distinction between student conduct that occurs on or off
campus in determining whether school officials may take action against
the student.”75 Other courts have found that misconduct that occurs

68. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.
69. Applying Fraser, lower courts have held that school officials may prohibit
students from wearing t-shirts that display vulgar messages, “even if the messages were
political, or the substance of the message conveyed was one supported by the school.”
SCHNEIDER, supra note 54, § 2:3 at 353. The standard set forth in Fraser “will generally
allow school officials to restrict vulgar, lewd, or plainly offensive speech.” Id. § 2:3 at
360.
70. S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs—Repression, Rights, and Respect:
A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 131 (1995).
71. Id.
72. SCHNEIDER, supra note 54, § 2:3 at 359–61.
73. Miller, supra note 49, at 636.
74. SCHNEIDER, supra note 54, § 2:3 at 222 (Supp. 2012) (citing Doninger v. Niehoff,
642 F.3d 334, 347–48 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 449 (2011) (“[T]he
applicability of Fraser to plainly offensive off-campus student speech is uncertain . . . .”)).
But see Layshock ex. rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir.
2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (en banc) (concluding that Fraser does not
apply to student’s off-campus speech); J.S. ex. rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
915, 932 n.12 (3d Cir. 2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (en banc) (“Fraser does
not apply to off-campus speech.”).
75. SCHNEIDER, supra note 54, § 2:3 at 210 (Supp. 2012); see also James M. Patrick,
Comment, The Civility-Police: The Rising Need to Balance Students’ Rights to Off-Campus
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outside of the school setting is not out of the reach of schools’
disciplinary authority.76
For example, in Morse v. Frederick, the Supreme Court grappled
with whether it was within the school’s authority to discipline a student
for speech that occurred off-campus, but at a school-sponsored event.77
In Morse, students and adults gathered across the street from the school
premises to watch the Olympic torch pass by their school.78 As the torch
went by, the students unrolled a banner that read, “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS.”79 The school principal was at the event and ordered the
students to put away the banner.80 Fredrick refused to follow the
principal’s instructions.81 As a result, the principal took the banner from
Fredrick and subsequently suspended him for ten days.82
Frederick filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Alaska and argued that the principal’s action of suspending him and
confiscating his banner violated his First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.83 Specifically, Fredrick argued that the school could not
suspend him for speech that occurred off the school’s premises.84 The
district court granted summary judgment for the school, and Fredrick
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.85 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court’s decision.86
The Ninth Circuit noted that although Frederick was off campus
when the incident occurred, he was at a school-authorized activity.87
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s decision hinged on its finding that
Fredrick’s display of the banner did not cause a substantial disruption,

Internet Speech Against the School’s Compelling Interests, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 855, 864–65
(2010).
76. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007). Lower courts have “held
that school authorities [can] restrict vulgar student personal speech either because the
manner of expression [is] inappropriate or because disruption could be reasonably
forecast given the manner or content . . . of the expression.” SCHNEIDER, supra note 54, §
2:3 at 360.
77. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396.
78. Id. at 397.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 398.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Frederick v. Morse, No. 02-008-CV, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27270, at *4.
84. Id. at *15–16.
85. Id. at *25.
86. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006).
87. Id.
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and therefore the school’s discipline was unconstitutional.88 In sum, the
Ninth Circuit found no disruption, and thus no basis for discipline.89
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.90 Finding in favor of the
school, the Supreme Court reasoned that it had the authority to
discipline Frederick without violating the First Amendment.91 The
Supreme Court found that even though Fredrick’s action occurred offcampus, it took place during school hours and at an approved school
event, where the school’s rules applied to students’ conduct.92 Because
of the nexus between the conduct and the school setting, the Court
noted that a student’s off-campus activity is not necessarily a haven from
school discipline.93
The Court also applied Tinker to the case, finding that when
student speech is reasonably construed as promoting illegal drug use,
school officials may conclude that it will “materially and substantially
disrupt the work and discipline of the school.”94 The Court stated that
“[t]he ‘special characteristics of the school environment’ . . . and the
governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse . . . allow schools
to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting
illegal drug use.”95 The Court noted the warnings from Tinker,
cautioning school administrators that they cannot prohibit student
speech because of “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”96
However, it stated, “[t]he danger here is far more serious and palpable.
The particular concern to prevent student drug abuse at issue here,
embodied in established school policy . . . extends well beyond an
abstract desire to avoid controversy.”97
Thus, Morse extended the reach of Tinker to off-campus schoolsponsored events that are supervised by school authorities. The Court
relied on the nexus between the student’s off-campus conduct and the
school setting. The Supreme Court’s decision in Morse supports the
proposition that in certain scenarios, the reasonable likelihood that a
88. Id. at 1123.
89. Id.
90. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400 (2007).
91. Id. at 397.
92. Id. at 400–01.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 403, 410 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 513 (1969)).
95. Id. at 408.
96. Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
97. Id. at 408–09.
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student’s conduct will cause a disruption with the school’s educational
mission is enough to warrant discipline.98
In contrast to Morse, in Klein v. Smith, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Maine held that the school did not provide sufficient facts
to support a nexus between the student’s off-campus conduct and the
school setting.99 There, a student, Jason Klein, was driven to an offcampus restaurant where he saw his teacher, Mr. Clark, inside his car
parked in front of the restaurant.100 Klein extended his middle finger
toward his teacher and then exited the vehicle.101 When Klein returned
to school, the administration suspended him for ten days “pursuant to a
school rule that provides that students will be suspended for ‘vulgar or
extremely inappropriate language or conduct directed to a staff
member.’”102 Immediately after Klein’s suspension, he filed a motion for
a temporary restraining order to enjoin the school from suspending him
until the court reviewed the merits of the school’s action.103 The district
court granted Klein’s temporary restraining order and after a full briefing
on the matter, issued a permanent injunction against the school’s
disciplinary suspension.104
The district court held that the school’s discipline violated Klein’s
First Amendment right to freedom of expression.105 The court reasoned
that Klein’s conduct of “giving the finger” to his teacher was “far too
attenuated” from the school grounds to support the school’s position
that Klein violated the rule prohibiting discourteous conduct toward a
teacher.106 In a footnote, Judge Gene Carter explained that Klein’s action
would not cause a substantial disruption at school because the teacher’s
“professional integrity, personal mental resolve, and individual character
[is] not going to dissolve, willy-nilly, in the face of the digital posturing
of this splenetic, bad-mannered little boy.”107

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. at 403–04.
Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441–42 (D. Me. 1986).
Id. at 1440.
Id. at 1441.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1441–42.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1441 n.4.
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II. “WHEN IT COMES TO STUDENT CYBER-SPEECH, THE LOWER COURTS
ARE IN COMPLETE DISARRAY . . . .”108
Many scholars and federal courts apply the tests set forth in Tinker,
Fraser, and other off-campus decisions—but there is no Supreme Court
authority on this issue.109
School teachers and authorities have a difficult job, and an
important one. They must act—or not act—on the spot when students
misbehave. The rise of social media has complicated their jobs. The
First Amendment does not require school authorities to tolerate
expressions that cause a substantial disruption in school.110 But where
do teachers draw the line with online speech? “It would be an unseemly
and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school
authorities, to reach into a child’s home and control his [or] her actions
there to the same extent that they can control that child when he [or]
she participates in school sponsored activities.”111 On the other hand, in
most cases, students post comments to their social media accounts after
school hours, and the posts carry over into the school—either physically
on phones, or verbally through the gossip mill.
Online chatter easily influences students’ behavior in class. Yet,
teachers are rightfully hesitant to discipline students––cautious that
taking action might result in a lawsuit. Teachers need guidance on
when they can and cannot constitutionally discipline a student for
online speech.
Although the Supreme Court has issued decisions and provided
guidelines on the extent to which school authorities may discipline

108. Kenneth R. Pike, Comment, Locating the Mislaid Gate: Revitalizing Tinker by
Repairing Judicial Overgeneralizations of Technologically Enabled Student Speech, 2008
BYU L. REV. 971, 990.
109. The Supreme Court considered whether to grant certiorari review of Layshock ex
rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock II), 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), J.S. ex
rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. II), 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), and Kowalski v.
Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). However, on January 17, 2012, the
Supreme Court denied the opportunity to hear any of the cases, leaving the issue
unresolved and left to simmer in the lower courts. See Tuesday, January 17, 2012,
Certiorari––Summary Dispositions, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 3, 12 (Jan. 17,
2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/011712zor.pdf. Similarly, the
Supreme Court also denied certiorari in Doninger v. Niehoff. See Doninger v. Niehoff,
527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011).
110. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
111. Brian Wassom, Social Media and Student Discipline In Public Schools,
WASSOM.COM (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.wassom.com/social-media-and-studentdiscipline-in-public-schools.html (quoting Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 260).
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students for off-campus conduct, the Court has not yet examined
whether school administrators may discipline students for off-campus
social media speech. The dilemma that courts face is clear and is further
highlighted by the wave of lower court decisions that involve students’
use of off-campus social media. The discussion that follows analyzes
several of these recent decisions.
A. The Third Circuit’s Interpretation of Student Cyber Speech
Courts that have considered the issues surrounding First
Amendment speech rights of public school students have taken
dramatically conflicting approaches in evaluating whether school
administrators may discipline students for such off-campus cyber
speech. The extent of this problem is illustrated by two 2010 decisions
issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: Layshock ex
rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District (Layshock II)112 and J.S. ex rel.
Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District (J.S. II).113 Both decisions dealt
with students who published speech on the Internet using private offcampus computers, and both were decided on February 4, 2010 by the
Third Circuit.114
In Layshock II, the Third Circuit applied Tinker and held that the
school unconstitutionally disciplined a student who posted a fake
Internet profile because there was no nexus between the off-campus
speech and the school.115 In contrast, in J.S. II, the Third Circuit applied
a different test and held that the school could discipline a student for offcampus speech occurring on a fictitious MySpace profile because it was
likely to create a substantial disruption in the classroom.116 From these
decisions—issued on the same day—emerged two different standards
within the Third Circuit for determining whether off-campus speech is
actionable.117 Because the Third Circuit panels in Layshock II and J.S. II

112. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock II), 593 F.3d 249
(3d Cir. 2010).
113. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. II), 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010).
114. See id. at 290; Layschock II, 593 F.3d at 251–52.
115. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 263.
116. J.S. II, 593 F.3d at 303.
117. This Article will refer to the standards as the “nexus” standard and the
“substantial disruption” standard.
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applied two conflicting standards, the Third Circuit reviewed both cases
en banc on June 13, 2011.118
1.

The “Nexus” Requirement—Layshock ex rel. Layshock v.
Hermitage School District (Layshock II)

In Layshock II, the Third Circuit held that school officials violated a
student’s First Amendment free speech rights by disciplining him for
creating a fake Internet “profile” of his principal on a social networking
website.119
The case began “when Justin Layshock used his
grandmother’s computer to access [MySpace,] a popular social
networking [I]nternet web site where he created a fake [I]nternet
‘profile’ of his high school principal.”120 On the fake profile, Layshock
posted a survey of questions and answers about the principal’s likes and
dislikes.121 Layshock crafted all of the principal’s answers to use the
word “big” because the principal was “apparently a large man.”122 A
synopsis of the fake profile appears below:
Birthday: too drunk to remember
Are you a health freak: big steroid freak
In the past month have you smoked: big blunt
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big dick
In the past month have you Stolen Anything: big keg[.]123

Layshock’s friends and most of the school’s student body viewed the
profile.124 Eventually, the teachers found out about Layshock’s profile
and parent meetings ensued.125 Layshock apologized to the principal for
creating the profile, and the school informed Layshock that an informal
hearing about the profile he created was to be held.126 Afterward, the
118. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock III), 650 F.3d 205,
205 (3d Cir. 2011); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. III), 650 F.3d 915, 915
(3d Cir. 2011).
119. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252.
120. Id. “MySpace is a popular social-networking website that ‘allows its members to
create online profiles, which are individual web pages on which members post
photographs, videos, and information about their lives and interests.’” Id. (quoting Doe
v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (internal quotation
omitted)).
121. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252–53.
122. Id. at 252.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 253.
125. Id. at 253–54.
126. Id. at 254.
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school district found Layshock guilty of violating the school’s discipline
code.127 As a result, the school suspended Layshock for ten days, banned
him from participating in extracurricular activities, and prevented him
from participating in his graduation ceremony.128
Layshock’s parents filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania.129 The district court denied the
Layshocks’ request for a temporary restraining order and ruled that a
jury trial was necessary to determine damages and attorney’s fees.130
“The parties subsequently filed a joint motion in which they stipulated to
damages and requested entry of final judgment while preserving all
appellate issues pertaining to liability. The district court then entered a
consent judgment, and this appeal and cross-appeal followed.”131
The district court held, and the Third Circuit affirmed, that the
profile Layshock created did not create a disruption under the standard
set forth in Tinker.132 The district court explained that the case involved
speech that “began with purely out-of-school conduct which
subsequently carried over into the school setting.”133 The court then
discussed Morse v. Frederick, and held that Morse was not the controlling
law in this matter because Morse involved school-related speech,
whereas this case involved off-campus speech.134 The court explained
that because this case involved off-campus speech, “the school must
demonstrate an appropriate nexus” between the student’s off-campus
speech and the school.135 Relying on Tinker, the court held that the
school impermissibly disciplined Layshock because the school district
did “not establish[] a sufficient nexus between [Layshock’s] speech and a
substantial disruption of the school environment.”136
The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that because the expressive
conduct occurred beyond the schoolhouse gates and did not cause a
disruption, the school district was “not empowered to punish his out of

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock I), 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D.
Pa. 2007).
130. Id. at 594.
131. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 255.
132. Layshock I, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600–01.
133. Id. at 595.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 599.
136. Id. at 600.
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school expressive conduct under the circumstances here.”137 In support
of its decision, the Third Circuit stated that “[a]llowing the District to
punish [Layshock] for conduct he engaged in using his grandmother’s
computer while at his grandmother’s house would create [an unseemly
and dangerous] precedent.”138 Thus, the Third Circuit’s reliance on
Tinker defines the outer boundaries of First Amendment protections of
off-campus cyber speech.
2.

The “Substantial Disruption” Requirement—J.S. ex rel. Snyder v.
Blue Mountain School District (J.S. II)

On the same day that the Third Circuit issued Layshock II, a
separate panel on the same court issued a contradictory opinion, based
on similar facts, in J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District.139
In J.S. II, J.S., an eighth grader, created a fictitious MySpace profile from
her home computer.140 The MySpace profile featured the school’s
principal, including his photograph and “profanity-laced statements
insinuating that he was a sex addict and pedophile.”141 After the
principal discovered the profile, he met with the school’s superintendent
and director of technology, and together they determined that J.S.’s
profile violated the School District’s Acceptable Use Policy.142 The
principal claimed that the “imposter profile” was a level-four infraction
under the school’s discipline code.143 After meeting with J.S., the
principal suspended her for ten days and threatened legal action.144
Subsequently, J.S. and her parents filed a complaint against the
school district in the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, alleging that the ten-day suspension violated J.S.’s First
Amendment free speech rights.145 The district court determined that the
discipline was unconstitutional under Tinker because it did not
137. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock II), 593 F.3d 249,
263 (3d Cir. 2010).
138. Id. at 260.
139. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. II), 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010).
140. Id. at 291.
141. Id. at 290. A synopsis of the “interests” section on the fictitious profile read as
follows: “[g]eneral detention. being a tight ass. riding the fraintrain. spending time
with my child (who looks like a gorilla). baseball. my golden pen. fucking in my office.
hitting on students and their parents.” Id. at 291.
142. Id. at 292.
143. Id. at 293.
144. Id.
145. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. I), No. 3:07-CV-585, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 72685, at *2–3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008).
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The court
substantially and materially disrupt the school.146
distinguished the facts of the two cases by stating, “[i]n the instant case,
the speech is not political [as in Tinker]; rather, it was vulgar and
offensive statement ascribed to the school principal. Therefore, we must
look further into the case law to determine the standard we must use.”147
As such, by applying a different standard, the district court held that the
school’s suspension of J.S. did not violate her First Amendment rights
because “the lewd and vulgar off-campus speech had an effect oncampus.”148
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision,
albeit under a different analysis, and held that the profile, “though
created off-campus, falls within the realm of student speech subject to
regulation under Tinker.”149 The Third Circuit did not first consider
whether the off-campus speech came on to the school’s campus.150 The
court reasoned that J.S.’s profile created a reasonable possibility of a
future disruption due to the sexually explicit content of the speech, and
because the profile was posted online, it constituted “a public means of
humiliating [the principal].”151
The Third Circuit’s finding of a substantial disruption turned on the
fact that the off-campus speech was posted on the Internet.152 The court
reasoned that “due to the technological advances of the Internet,” the
profile that J.S. created “could be, and in fact was, viewed by at least
twenty-two members of the Middle School community within a matter
of days.”153 Although the actual disruption was nonexistent, or minimal
at best, the court reasoned that the substantial likelihood for future
disruption was inevitable “especially in light of the inherent potential of
the Internet to allow rapid dissemination of information.”154 In sum, the
court concluded that the off-campus speech created or reasonably
threatened to create a substantial disruption within the school, and
therefore, the school district could discipline J.S., regardless of the fact
that the speech occurred off-campus.155

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at *12.
Id.
Id. at *22.
J.S. II, 593 F.3d at 298.
Id.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 300–01.
Id.
Id. at 301.
Id.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2013

19

1. STRUMWASSER_FINAL - 1.8.14 WITH HEADING

1/17/2014 5:17 PM

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1

20

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1

In a strong partial dissent, Judge Chagares argued that the school
impermissibly suspended J.S. “for speech that took place outside the
schoolhouse gates, during non-school hours, and that indisputably
caused no substantial disruption in school.”156 Judge Chagares explained
that he “believe[d] that this holding vests school officials with
dangerously overbroad censorship discretion.”157
Judge Chagares
reasoned that just because J.S. published the profile online, it was
impermissible to assume that the profile would create a substantial
disruption inside the schoolhouse gates.158 To the contrary, Judge
Chagares opined that J.S.’s speech “caused no substantial disruption in
school.”159 Judge Chagares accused the majority of misinterpreting the
necessary balance between students’ First Amendment rights and school
administrators’ need to maintain a proper learning environment.160 He
went on to state that “the majority attempts to overcome this
considerable hurdle by adopting the standard put forth by several of our
sister courts of appeals, which allows schools to meet the Tinker test by
showing that a substantial disruption was ‘reasonably foreseeable.’”161
Judge Chagares argued that the majority’s position was contrary to the
Tinker test.162 Even under that test, the facts do not reasonably support a
forecast of disruption because “J.S. did not even intend for the speech to
reach the school—in fact, she took specific steps to make the profile
‘private’ so that only her friends could access it.”163
In sum, Layshock II and J.S. II applied different variations of the
Tinker standard and reached opposite conclusions on seemingly similar
facts. These decisions, published by the Third Circuit on the same day,
are perfect examples of the clear misunderstanding of which standard
applies when evaluating students’ off-campus cyber speech. Because of
the contradictory outcomes in Layshock II and J.S. II, the Third Circuit
vacated both rulings and granted an en banc rehearing.164

156. Id. at 308.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 317.
159. Id. at 308.
160. Id. at 311.
161. Id. at 313 (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 316.
164. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. III), 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.
Dist. (Layshock III), 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
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The Third Circuit’s En Banc Review of Layshock II and J.S. II

On review, the Third Circuit relied on Tinker in finding that the
School District’s actions in J.S. III violated J.S.’s First Amendment
rights.165 In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that an “undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right
to freedom of expression.”166 Based on the facts in the record here, the
Third Circuit distinguished the “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance” from “a reasonable forecast [of] a substantial disruption or
material interference.”167 The court held that because the profile was
created as a joke, and it was unlikely to be taken seriously, it did not
create a reasonable forecast of a substantial disruption.168 Moreover, the
court held that the evidence supported J.S.’s assertion that she did not
intend for the speech to reach the school because she took steps to make
the profile “private” so that only her friends could access it.169
The Third Circuit’s en banc ruling affirmed that the Supreme Court
has never “allowed schools to punish students for off-campus speech
that is not school-sponsored or at a school-sponsored event and that
caused no substantial disruption at school.”170 In the end, in both J.S. III
and Layshock III, the Third Circuit held that the school administration
could not discipline off-campus speech.171
The discussion of Layshock and J.S. sets forth the clear dichotomy
among circuit courts applying Tinker to off-campus cyber speech. The
cases demonstrate that courts are struggling to determine how Tinker
applies to off-campus speech. Whereas Layshock III focuses on the
“nexus” between off-campus speech and the schoolhouse gates, J.S. III
follows the logic and letter of Tinker and analyzes whether the offcampus speech created a foreseeable “substantial disruption.”

165. J.S. III, 650 F.3d at 920.
166. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
167. J.S. III, 650 F.3d at 930.
168. Id. at 929–30.
169. Id. at 929.
170. Id. at 933.
171. Id. at 920; Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock III), 650
F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that “under these circumstances, the First
Amendment prohibits the school from reaching beyond the schoolyard to impose what
might otherwise be appropriate discipline. . . . [and] that the school district’s response to
[Layshock’s] conduct transcended the protection of free expression guaranteed by the
First Amendment”).
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B. Recent Rulings that Forbid School Administrators from Disciplining
Off-Campus Speech
Like the Third Circuit’s en banc rulings in Layshock III and J.S. III,
several recent rulings from other courts have also held that school
administrators cannot discipline off-campus speech. For example, in
Evans v. Bayer, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida held that Evans’s speech fell “under the wide umbrella of
protected speech.”172 In Evans, school administrators suspended Evans,
a high school senior, for creating a Facebook group that expressed her
dislike for a teacher, Ms. Phelps.173 Evans titled the Facebook group
“Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met.”174 Evans created
the Facebook group off-campus, from her home computer.175 The court
noted that Ms. Phelps never saw the Facebook group and that it did not
create disruption at school.176 Once the school caught wind of Evans’s
Facebook group and suspended her from school, Evans filed suit in the
district court, asserting that the suspension violated her First
Amendment rights.177
Like the Third Circuit, the court held that Evans’s Facebook page
was protected speech.178 The court relied on Tinker and stated that “the
key” in determining whether the school administrators could suspend
Evans for her Facebook group depended on “whether the school
administrators have a well-founded belief that a ‘substantial’ disruption
will occur.”179 The court determined that no facts in the complaint
established that the school had a well-founded expectation that Evans’s
Facebook group would create a disruption inside the school.180 Evans’s
speech was merely an opinion about a teacher “that was published offcampus, did not cause any disruption on-campus, and was not lewd,
vulgar, threatening, or advocating illegal or dangerous behavior.”181
More recently, in T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Community School
Corp., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana also

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
Id. at 1367.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1367–68.
Id. at 1377.
Id. at 1373.
Id.
Id. at 1374.
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upheld student speech rights.182 In this case, a group of 15 and 16-yearold girls were suspended from their school volleyball team for posting
provocative photos of themselves on MySpace, Facebook, and Photo
Bucket.183 The photos were later given to school authorities, who
suspended the girls from extra-curricular activities for the school year.184
In suspending the students, the school relied on a policy in the Student
Handbook that stated: “[i]f you act in a manner in school or out of
school that brings discredit or dishonor upon yourself or your school,
you may be removed from extra-curricular activities for all or part of the
year.”185 The students, through their parents, filed suit alleging that the
punishment violated their First Amendment rights of free speech.186 In
the words of Chief Judge Philip P. Simon, writing for the court:
Let’s be honest about it: the speech in this case doesn’t exactly call to
mind high-minded civic discourse about current events. And one could
reasonably question the wisdom of making a federal case out of a 6–
game suspension from a high school volleyball schedule. But for better
or worse, that’s what this case is about and it is now ripe for
disposition.187

Ultimately, the court held that although the girls’ photos were ridiculous
and inappropriate, they were expressive and subject to First Amendment
protection.188
Applying the Tinker substantial and material disruption test, the
court reasoned that the girls’ pictures did not substantially disrupt the
work and discipline of the school setting.189 Noting that an actual
disruption is not required for school administrators to take action, the
court reaffirmed that “Tinker requires a specific and significant fear of
disruption, not just some remote apprehension of disturbance.”190 In
this case, the court held that the girls’ conduct did “not come close to
meeting the Tinker standard.”191 Here, there was no disruption during
any school activity and the students’ conduct did not interfere with
182. T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784–85
(N.D. Ind. 2011).
183. Id. at 771–72.
184. Id. at 773–74.
185. Id. at 773.
186. Id. at 771.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 775–76.
189. Id. at 784.
190. Id. at 782 (quoting Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d
Cir. 2001)).
191. Id. at 783.
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schoolwork.192 In sum, the court held that the facts in this case “can’t be
what the Supreme Court had in mind when it enunciated the ‘substantial
disruption’ standard in Tinker. To find otherwise would be to read the
word ‘substantial’ out of ‘substantial disruption.’”193
C. Recent Rulings that Allow School Administrators to Discipline OffCampus Speech
Notwithstanding the foregoing cases, several other courts have
issued rulings that allow schools to discipline students for off-campus
cyber speech. In these instances, the courts have found that there is a
sufficient nexus between the speech and the schoolhouse gates.194
For example, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport
Central School District, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the student’s AOL Instant
Messenger icon depicting a pistol firing a bullet over a person’s head
would cross the schoolhouse gates because the icon included the words
“Kill Mr. VanderMolen”––the student’s teacher.195 The court explained
that there was, therefore, a sufficient nexus for the school to regulate the
student’s off-campus cyber speech.196 As for Tinker’s substantial
disruption requirement, the court held that “there can be no doubt that
the icon, once made known to the teacher and other school officials,
would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the
school environment.”197
One year later, in Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit similarly
held that a risk of substantial disruption created by a student’s offcampus cyber speech was sufficient for the school to discipline the
student.198 In Doninger, students on the Student Council planned a
The school reschool-sponsored battle-of-the-bands concert.199
scheduled the event and as a result, the plaintiff, a student council
member, sent an e-mail from her father’s e-mail address urging parents
to contact the school administrators regarding the rescheduling of the

192. Id.
193. Id. at 784.
194. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 54, § 2:26, at 608–09.
195. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 35–37
(2d Cir. 2007).
196. Id. at 38–39.
197. Id. at 40.
198. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 52–53 (2d Cir. 2008).
199. Id. at 44.
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concert.200 The plaintiff also posted a message on her publicly accessible
On plaintiff’s blog, she called school administrators
blog.201
“douchebags.”202 The school found out about the plaintiff’s blog, and
subsequently barred her from running for senior class secretary.203 The
plaintiff filed a lawsuit, alleging that the school violated her First
Amendment freedom of speech rights.204 The district court upheld the
school’s disciplinary conduct, concluding that a preliminary injunction
was not warranted because the plaintiff “ha[d] failed to show a clear or
substantial likelihood of success on the merits[.]”205
On appeal, the Second Circuit relied on Tinker and held that “it was
objectively reasonable for school officials to conclude that [plaintiff’s]
behavior was potentially disruptive of student government functions . . .
and that [plaintiff] was not free to engage in such behavior while serving
as a class representative.”206 Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court’s holding.207
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached the same
conclusion in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, upholding the
suspension of a student who engaged in off-campus online bullying.208
In this case, Kowalski, a high school senior, created a MySpace group
targeting a classmate named Shay.209 Kowalski called the MySpace group
“SASH,” which stood for “Students Against Shay’s Herpes.”210 Kowalski
invited about 100 others to join the MySpace Group, and over two dozen
students responded and did join.211 Kowalski encouraged the group
members to ridicule Shay on the MySpace page.212 Students uploaded

200. Id. at 44.
201. Id. at 45.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 46.
204. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 210 (D. Conn. 2007) aff’d, 527 F.3d
41 (2d Cir. 2008).
205. Id. at 219.
206. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 351 (2d Cir. 2011). The Second Circuit was
faced with a subsequent appeal three years later after the plaintiff had graduated from
high school where she sought damages. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled
to damages and that defendants had qualified immunity. See id. at 344, 356–58.
207. Id. at 357.
208. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011).
209. Id. at 567–68.
210. Id. at 567.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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pictures of Shay and posted hurtful messages.213 As a result, school
administrators suspended Kowalski from school and from the
cheerleading team.214
Kowalski filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia alleging, among other things, that the school
district erroneously suspended her for “private out-of-school speech” in
violation of the First Amendment.215 The district court granted
summary judgment for the school district and held that it could suspend
Kowalski for the content she posted on the Internet because it caused an
in-school disruption.216
On appeal, Kowalski asserted that “[t]he Supreme Court ha[d] been
consistently careful to limit intrusions on students’ rights to conduct
taking place on school property, at school functions, or while engaged in
school-sponsored or school-sanctioned activity.”217 She argued that “no
Supreme Court case addressing student speech has held that a school
may punish students for speech away from school[;]” rather, “every
Supreme Court case addressing student speech has taken pains to
emphasize that, were the speech in question to occur away from school,
it would be protected.”218
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling hinged on the determination of whether
Kowalski’s activity fell within the boundaries of the school’s interest “in
maintaining order in the school and protecting the well-being and
educational rights of its students.”219 Relying on the nexus between
Kowalski’s off-campus speech and the classroom setting, as well as the
Tinker substantial disruption test, the Fourth Circuit noted:
Kowalski used the Internet to orchestrate a targeted attack on a
classmate, and did so in a manner that was sufficiently connected to the
school environment as to implicate the School District’s recognized
authority to discipline speech which materially and substantially
interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school and collid[es] with the rights of others.220

213. Id.
214. Id. at 569.
215. Id. at 567, 570.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 571.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 567 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
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The court paid careful attention to the subject matter of Kowalski’s
Internet activity—bullying another student.221 As such, its ruling
protects school administrators’ actions because they “must be able to
prevent and punish harassment and bullying in order to provide a safe
school environment conducive to learning.”222 The court noted that
there is certainly “a limit to the scope of a high school’s interest in the
order, safety, and well-being of its students when the speech at issue
originates outside the schoolhouse gate.”223 Nevertheless, the Fourth
Circuit refrained from defining that limit in Kowalski. Clearly, courts
continue to struggle “to strike a balance between safeguarding students’
First Amendment rights and protecting the authority of school
administrators to maintain an appropriate learning environment.”224
III. SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS ARE LEFT IN LIMBO
Although off-campus cyber speech rulings apply facets of Tinker,
the decisions leave school administrators wondering––how can they
reconcile the inconsistent rulings? Courts are clearly conflicted as to
how far the school’s authority reaches to punish students’ off-campus
cyber speech.
While courts continue to apply the “substantial
disruption” Tinker test, the outcome under this test is inconsistent when
applied to off-campus Internet speech. Sometimes the school district
wins.225 Sometimes the student wins.226 Sometimes courts within the
same circuit issue conflicting rulings.227
Until the Supreme Court addresses this issue, school administrators
will remain rightfully hesitant to discipline students for their online
content, wary of a lawsuit that may arise in the aftermath. Thus, school
administrators are left uncertain of the scope of their authority.

221. Id. at 572.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 573.
224. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. III), 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
225. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Doninger v.
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch.
Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
226. See T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D.
Ind. 2011); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
227. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock II), 593 F.3d
249 (3d Cir. 2010); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. II), 593 F.3d 286 (3d
Cir. 2010).
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When the Supreme Court finally addresses this issue, it should
make clear when students’ off-campus online speech is intrusive enough
to cause a “substantial disruption” inside schools. In applying the Tinker
substantial disruption test to cyber speech, the Court will likely focus on
the nexus between the off-campus online content and examine its effect
inside the school. School authorities would be well served by a ruling
that articulates what constitutes a de minimis disruption, where the
school may not discipline a student, and what constitutes a substantial
disruption that warrants discipline.
The lower courts seem to have come to a consensus that online
speech that leads to bullying, harassment, physical fights, the inability to
keep control in the classroom, and the inability to teach the curriculum,
creates a substantial disruption in school and therefore the school may
discipline the student for such online speech.228 But, the effect of offcampus cyber speech is more far reaching than those “clear cut”
instances. Students’ online remarks have also lead to stress for the
harassed student, missing school, suicide attempts, failing grades,
withdrawal from school clubs and activities—and the list goes on.
Should such circumstances constitute a substantial disruption? Or are
they merely de minimis, and therefore outside the school administrators’
disciplinary arm? Alas, we await a ruling from the Supreme Court for an
answer.
IV. CONCLUSION––A WORD TO THE WISE
Because there are no clear parameters surrounding school
administrators’ authority to discipline students for off-campus online
content, school systems should proceed carefully when dealing with
students whose online content makes its way to the classroom.
Nevertheless, schools cannot avoid the issue altogether because it is
quite evident that social media is here to stay. Until the Supreme Court
addresses this issue, the decisions illustrated in this Article should guide
school authorities in disciplining students for their off-campus Internet
speech.
School administrators should continue to act with caution when
disciplining students for online content and should remain aware that
many students are apt to challenge school authority in the courts. In the
event that discipline leads to litigation, school administrators must be
able to show that the students’ online content caused, or could have
228. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567; Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at
35.
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reasonably caused, a substantial disruption at school. Although we do
not know what exactly constitutes a substantial disruption, school
administrators should protect themselves by creating a clear record that
provides evidence of a nexus between the off-campus content and
instances of disruption inside the school. While there are no hard and
fast rules as to what constitutes a substantial disruption, this standard
certainly requires more than the display of a student’s impermissible offcampus conduct.
School administrators will also be well served to create social media
policies and to distribute them to all students, faculty, and parents at the
beginning of each school year. Such policies would benefit both
students and educators by setting the expectations of the school. Social
media policies that include constitutionally permissible restrictions
would benefit school administrators and school districts in defending
cyber speech lawsuits. Until the Supreme Court stakes its claim, school
authorities should shape social media policies around the Tinker
substantial disruption test.
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